The paper presents an economic analysis of the Standard Reinsurance Agreement (SRA), the contract that governs the relationship between the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation and the private insurance companies that deliver crop insurance products to farmers. The paper outlines provisions of the SRA and describes the modeling methodology behind the SRA simulator, a computer program developed to assist crop insurers and policymakers in assessing the economic impact of the Agreement. The simulator is then used to analyze how the SRA affects returns from underwriting crop insuranceat various levels of aggregation.
While there has been much research on the federal crop insurance program, most of the focus has been on how insurance affects producer-level risk and the demand for crop insurance. Research on the reinsurance agreement has focused largely on the use of contingency markets such as futures and options as alternatives to traditional reinsurance (Miranda and Glauber; Mason, Hayes and Lence; Turvey, Nayak and Sparling) . An exception is a recent paper by Ker and McGowan that considers the ability of crop insurance companies to adversely select against the FCIC. Using a stylized model of the SRA that considered wheat yield distributions in 57 Texas counties, they demonstrated that companies could increase expected underwriting gains by ceding more risk to the FCIC in those year where ex-ante projections of wheat yields suggested potential crop insurance losses. Yet, while their paper provides insight into how companies may increase underwriting gains through the SRA, their empirical findings are limited in scope. Crop insurance companies typically write policies in more than one state and several operate nationwide. Expected underwriting gains depend on the underlying crop yield distributions across commodities and regions and the structure of the SRA. Changes in the latter can have significant effects on the distribution of underwriting gains and implications for how companies can best maximize returns.
In this paper, we examine the Standard Reinsurance Agreement between insurance companies participating in delivery of crop insurance products and the FCIC. Using historical data on yields and insurance losses for each crop reporting district, crop, and insurance product, we simulate a distribution of the book of business resulting from underwriting crop insurance. Distributions of returns are then calculated at various levels of aggregation. The effect of SRA on the rates of return are analyzed in aggregate and also at the regional and individual company levels.
Standard Reinsurance Agreement
FCIC provides reinsurance for the participating companies in exchange for a portion of insurance premiums collected by those companies. The reinsurance comes in two forms: proportional and nonproportional. Under the former, the companies cede their liability for ultimate net losses in exchange for an equal percentage of the associated net premiums, i.e. completely transfer a portion of their book of business to the FCIC. The nonproportional reinsurance is then applied to the remaining or retained portion of companies' books of business. Nonproportional reinsurance is similar to traditional reinsurance in that the FCIC shares losses with the companies in exchange for a portion of their underwriting gain
Under the proportional reinsurance, each company may allocate its contracts to one of the three reinsurance funds: Assigned Risk Fund, Developmental Fund, and 1 Underwriting gain is the amount by which premiums collected by a company exceed its losses or the total indemnities it had to pay.
Commercial Fund. The funds differ in the required level of retention and also in the FCIC shares of gains and losses from retained business under the nonproportional insurance.
The Assigned Risk Fund is characterized by the lowest required retention rate (20%) which makes it the primary designation for the high-risk contracts. However, the SRA establishes maximum Assigned Risk Fund cession limits, which vary by state and range between 10% and 75% of the total book of business in the state (USDA/RMA 1997, p.10).
The Developmental and Commercial Funds have higher minimum retention requirements (35% and 50%, respectively). In addition, they are further subdivided into CAT Table 1 . As the loss ratio increases, FCIC assumes a larger fraction of company's losses, up to 100% of the portion of losses in excess of 2 Catastrophic Risk Protection 3 The majority of contracts placed in this fund are Actual Production History (APH) products. 4 A loss ratio is defined as a ratio of the total indemnities paid by the company to the total retained premiums. The loss ratio above 100% means that the company suffered a net underwriting loss, while the loss ratio below 100% indicates that the company earned a net underwriting gain.
5 The version of the Agreement currently in effect was approved by the RMA and private insurance companies in July 1997 and was subsequently amended by the Agricultural Research, Extension, and Education Reform Act of 1998. The SRA has been renewed annually by RMA through the 2004 reinsurance year. The Agricultural Risk Protection Act of 2000 mandated that the SRA has to be renegotiated by the 2005 reinsurance year, which begins on July 1, 2004. At the time of writing, the negotiations were underway, but no final agreement has been released. 500% of the total retained premiums. At the same time, FCIC claims a larger fraction of companies' underwriting gains as their loss ratios decrease. Figure 1 illustrates the aggregate effect of SRA on companies' loss ratios for different reinsurance funds. The Assigned Risk Fund provides the highest level of protection against losses but also leaves the reinsureds with the smallest fraction of the gains.
The Commercial Fund, on the other hand, gives the reinsureds the highest return in case of the underwriting gain, but also leaves the largest portion of the net losses on their balances.
For modeling purposes, the risk sharing provisions of the SRA can be completely described by the required retention rates for each fund, the breakpoints of the loss ratio ranges, and the shares of the underwriting losses or gains assumed by the companies within each range.
Modeling Methodology

Overview
The objective of the SRA model is to simulate distributions of rates of return from underwriting crop insurance. The rates are driven by net underwriting gains/losses defined for modeling purposes as the difference between the premiums collected and indemnities paid. Since the latter depends on occurrence or nonoccurrence of random events, rates of return are random variables. Reinsurance provided by FCIC is designed to reduce the downside variability of these random variables and possibly increase their expected values.
Under the SRA, rates of return are determined by particular realizations of companies' loss ratios at the state level and the SRA parameters, i.e. retention rates, breakpoints, and shares. Therefore, in order to analyze the effect of SRA on the rates of return, one needs to model the distribution of loss ratios by state and fund for each company reinsured by the FCIC.
The random variables that drive the loss ratios are farm-level yields and prices, which determine the insurance loss for any given contract and thus ultimately the aggregate losses for any company. However, information on farm-level yields and prices alone is not enough, as it does not reflect the adverse selection present in the crop insurance portfolio and the additional losses companies incur due to moral hazard. Therefore, the farm-level data on yields and prices should be combined with appropriate participation data to fully reflect the distribution of gains and losses in insurance portfolios. 6 The premium rate of a contract is a ratio of its premium to the associated liability.
In order to circumvent data limitations and derive distributions of loss ratios that reflect the historical changes in the crop insurance programs, the following strategy is implemented. It is assumed that historical loss costs, or ratios of indemnities to the total liabilities, accurately reflect the true distribution of underwriting losses. That is, it is assumed that the loss costs by crop reporting district 7 , crop, and insurance product observed over the historical period were generated by stationary data-generating processes that are uniform across companies and reinsurance funds.
Historical loss costs are available for 1981-2001 for selected APH yield contracts but only in aggregate, thus providing no information about the distribution of loss costs for specific APH yield contracts, nor other contracts such as CAT and revenue products. The loss costs for individual products, however, can be simulated by using historical data on yields and prices and then adjusted to match the observed aggregate loss costs.
The derived distribution of loss costs for each district, crop, and product can be combined with the data on liabilities and premium rates for the base year (2001) and aggregated to compute distributions of loss ratios for each company by state and reinsurance fund. The distributions of the loss ratios can then be used along with the SRA parameters to compute expectations and standard deviations of the rates of return by company, state, and/or reinsurance fund.
Implementation
The first step in simulating aggregate loss costs of an insurance company by state and fund is to simulate loss costs for individual insurance contracts (products) included in the company's portfolio. While there are more than 20 types of products available for more than 100 crops, the lack of adequate data and the limited scope of some programs do not allow to incorporate all of them into a simulation model.
For the purposes of analysis, six crops and five major types of insurance products are considered.
The crops incorporated in the model are barley, corn, cotton, soybeans, grain sorghum, and winter wheat (0.8%, 42.7%, 13.2%, 27.3%, 2.2%, and 13.7% of total premiums included in the model, respectively). The insurance products incorporated 
is fitted for each crop and district. The district yields detrended to 2001 equivalents are calculated as
where y t are the observed yields and y tr t are the corresponding yield trends. The detrended yields then used to construct the empirical probability density function of base-year yield distribution by assigning equal weights to each observation. Such an approach allows to capture correlations between yields in different districts and for different crops in a simple and efficient way.
The distribution of yields within the district is modeled using a representative farmer model. For a given realization of a (detrended) district yield y d , it is assumed that the individual farm's yield y f is log-normally distributed around the district average so that
where the parameters µ and σ of normal distribution may depend on the district yield. Under these assumptions, the loss cost for an APH product with the coverage level η can be calculated as
The historical loss costs are available in aggregate for selected products (APH 35% and {50%, 55%, . . . , 85%}) along with data on liabilities by individual product.
Thus the simulated loss costs can be aggregated using the actual liabilities as weights and compared to the historically observed loss costs. The parameters of the normal distribution can be then calibrated so as to minimize the difference between the two.
Formally, for a given district, crop, and year, let LC sim (i p |µ, σ) be the simulated loss cost for the APH product i p , given the parametrization (µ, σ) of the yield shock ε, let LC agg hist be the historical aggregate loss cost, let B ⊆ {1, . . . , n p } be the index subset of APH products included in the aggregate loss cost data, and let L hist (i p ) be the historical liabilities for products in B. The aggregate simulated loss cost for the products in B can then be calculated as
, and the distribution parameters µ and σ can be found by solving
Once the parameters of the random shocks are calibrated, it is assumed that they correctly represent the variability of yields for the specific crop, district, and year and thus can be used to simulate the loss costs for all other products included in the model. In addition to yields, distributions of harvest-time prices are required to calculate loss costs for revenue products. The latter are modeled for each crop as
where p h is the harvest price, p b is the base (projected) price, y nat is the detrended national yield, y nat is the average detrended national yield, α is the elasticity parameter, and z is a random shock independent of y nat and distributed normally with zero mean and some variance σ 2 .
By combining distributions of yields (3) calibrated according to (4) with the price distributions in (5) 
respectively, where the first summation in all equations is over all districts in the state i s .
In order to account for the proportional part of the SRA, the base year liabilities need to be adjusted by the appropriate retention rates. 
and, if necessary, can be further aggregated by state, company, and/or reinsurance fund. The subsequent analysis also -uses the rates of return as percent of gross premiums, which can be expressed as
The sample statistics can be then calculated for both distributions in an obvious way, e.g.
The model is implemented as a Fortran 95 program that employs historical data and the SRA parameters as input. The program outputs a variety of information including expectations and standard deviations of both rates of return and net underwriting gains/losses at different levels of aggregation.
Simulations Results and Discussion
In order to analyze the effect of the SRA on the variability of the loss ratios and and variability of the loss ratios ( Table 2) . As expected, the reinsurance provisions of the Assigned Risk Fund result in the largest decrease in variability of loss ratios (93%) as well as the largest decrease in their expected values (12.3%).
The reinsurance provisions of the Developmental and Commercial Funds decrease the variability of loss ratios to a lesser extent, while also resulting in lower decreases in the expected values.
Since most companies underwrite crop insurance in more than one state, it is important to consider how SRA affects returns on the regional basis. Presented in . The lower the HHI, the more diversified is the portfolio. Conversely, the closer HHI to the maximum of 10,000, the fewer states are included in the portfolio.
The second measure is the proportions of each company's gross premiums in two regions identified based on the results of Table 3 Note: FCIC keeps the portions of underwriting gains or assumes the ultimate net losses in excess of companies' shares as determined in the table. In addition, FCIC assumes 100% of the amount by which companies' retained losses in a given state and fund exceed 500% of the retained net book premium for a given reinsurance year. Dev.
( 2) of Return (2) Dev.
( 2) of Return (2) Dev. 
